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Abstract
This article claries the roles played by trade policy, in contrast with iceberg
transport cost, in the popular setting of Melitz (2003), and characterizes the
optimal reciprocal trade policy in such a setting. I show that import tari¤s
and iceberg transport cost are not equivalent in the strength of their trade-
restricting e¤ects and their welfare implications. With all the conicting e¤ects
of import tari¤s on welfare considered, the optimal degree of reciprocity in
multilateral tari¤ reduction turns out to be free trade.
JEL Classication: F12, F13.
Key Words: Firm Heterogeneity, Reciprocal Trade Policy.
1 Introduction
This article claries the roles played by trade policy, in contrast with iceberg transport
cost, in the popular setting of Melitz (2003), and characterizes the optimal reciprocal
trade policy in such a setting. Import tari¤s and iceberg transport cost were often
taken to be equivalent in the literature following Melitz (2003), and trade liberaliza-
tion was often modeled as a consequence of exogenous reduction in transport cost.
This is contrary to the focus of trade liberalization in practice where trade policy
plays a central role and its level is an object of negotiation.
I thank Marc Melitz and Tomoki Fujii for their helpful discussions.
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I show in the derivations below that import tari¤s have a more severe trade-
restricting e¤ect than iceberg transport cost, such that the cuto¤ productivity level
for rms to produce is lower and the cuto¤ productivity level for rms to export is
higher. As a result, a larger mass of local rms (varieties) and a smaller mass of
competing foreign rms (varieties) can survive with import tari¤s than with iceberg
transport cost.
The characterization of welfare also changes signicantly when trade cost is repre-
sented by import tari¤s instead of iceberg transport cost. In particular, one needs to
take into account the nominal income change (via tari¤ revenues) in addition to the
aggregate productivity (price) change as the tari¤ rate varies. Tari¤ revenues increase
non-monotonically as the tari¤ increases above the free trade level, while the price
decreases non-monotonically as the tari¤decreases below the free trade level. The net
e¤ect of the two, however, has a unique maximum and the result below shows that free
trade turns out to be the optimal reciprocal policy. This free trade result is nontrivial
given the presence of imperfect competition and price markup on one hand (which
tends to encourage the use of import tari¤s) and the presence of endogenous intra-
industry reallocations of market shares across rms of heterogeneous productivities
on the other hand (which tends to encourage the use of import subsidies).
2 Model
In Melitz (2003), it is assumed that there are (n+ 1) symmetric countries, each with
a population size L. In each country, a representative consumer has a C.E.S. utility
function with an exponent  over a continuum of goods. The set of goods produced
are endogenously determined and are produced using labor alone. Wage is taken to
be the numeraire. There is an unbounded mass of potential rms, who can choose
to pay a xed entry investment cost fe to draw a productivity parameter ' from
a common distribution g(') and decide whether to produce a good (variety). To
produce a good, a rm has to pay a xed overhead cost f and a constant marginal
cost 1
'
. To export to each of the other n countries, a rm has to pay in addition a
xed trade cost fx, and take into account a variable iceberg transport cost; that is, 
units of a good must be shipped in order for one unit to arrive at destination. If rms
decide to produce, there is a probability  per period that they will be hit by bad
shocks and exit the market. Given the above cost structure that applies every period,
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rms calculate the expected prots of entry based on the productivity distribution
g(') and enter the market if the expected prots from all future periods cover the
entry cost fe. Equilibrium is characterized by the cuto¤ productivity level ' for
production, the cuto¤ productivity level 'x for rms to export, the mass M of local
varieties produced, and the mass Mx of local varieties exported (or equivalently, the
mass of imported varieties from each of the trading partners).
Let the setup be the same as in Melitz (2003), but let the variable trade cost
be import tari¤s instead of iceberg transport cost. Let  denote one plus the ad
valorem tari¤ rate. Given the C.E.S. preference, a rm with a productivity level '
will charge a producer price pd = 1' , which is also the consumer price at home, but
will charge a higher consumer price abroad px = ' to reect the import tari¤. The
rm sells a quantity qd = Q(pd=P )  and receives a revenue rd = pdqd = E(pd=P )1 
in its home market, where  = 1
1  is the elasticity of substitution across goods
that enter the utility function and equivalently the aggregate quantity index Q, P
is the associated aggregate price of the goods, and E  PQ is the corresponding
aggregate expenditure. The rm, if it exports, sells a quantity qx = Q(px=P )  and
receives a revenue rx = pdqx =  rd from each of the n overseas markets. Let d 
rd  (f +qd=') and x  rx  (fx+qx=') denote the corresponding prots made from
catering to the domestic market and from each of the n overseas markets by the rm.
Comparing the above expressions with those in Melitz (2003), we could see that
import tari¤s di¤er from iceberg transport cost in two fundamental ways. First, recall
that in the case of iceberg transport cost, an exporter receives an export revenue pxqx
from each of the n overseas markets, which is higher compared with the export revenue
pdqx in the current case of import tari¤s. To see why, note that the export revenue
in the case of iceberg transport cost can be read in two ways: pxqx = pdqx (that is,
for the consumer in the importing country, the consumer price of the imported good
is e¤ectively px = pd for each unit of the good actually received) or pxqx = pdqx
(that is, for the exporter, the producer price is pd, but more units, qx, are produced
than actually consumed, qx). The exporting rm e¤ectively sells the extra units of
the good (  1)qx that melt away in transit to the consumer at the producer price pd
and receives a revenue pd(   1)qx for producing them. Thus, at the end of the day,
the exporter does not bear the iceberg transport cost (although its sales volume qx is
indirectly a¤ected by the higher consumer price px); the importing country does. In
the case of import tari¤s, the exporting rm pays the tari¤ revenue (  1)pdqx out of
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its gross sales pxqx and receives a net export revenue pdqx from each of the n overseas
markets. Thus, exporters are a¤ected more severely by import tari¤s than iceberg
transport cost by a factor of  in terms of export revenues. As will be shown below,
this di¤erence leads to changes in the cuto¤ productivity level for export (as it takes
a more productive rm in the case of import tari¤s to make enough revenues to cover
the cost of export) and in the cuto¤ productivity level for production, as well as in
the mass of local and foreign varieties available.
Second, although both types of trade cost leads to a higher overseas consumer price
px (relative to pd in the domestic market for a given variety), in the case of import
tari¤s, the price premium is captured by the importing country as tari¤ revenues, and
the country as a whole pays the same producer price pd as the home country of the
producer; in the case of iceberg transport cost, the units of the good that melt away
during the transit are lost to the importing country. Thus, with import tari¤s, the
welfare calculation changes, as tari¤ revenues now enter as an extra source of income
in addition to the wage income. With import tari¤s, the focus of welfare calculation
also changes from a positive question (what is the impact on a countrys welfare as
the level of transport cost changes following an exogenous technology shock) to a
normative question (what is the optimal reciprocal tari¤ rate for countries to levy).
With transport cost,  is necessarily greater than one; with trade policy,  could
range from being less than one (an import subsidy), one (free trade), to greater than
one (an import tari¤).
The trade policy studied in this article corresponds to the multilateral, reciprocal,
import policy that is agreed upon by countries and imposed simultaneously against
each other. Although the export policy will not be analyzed, the equivalence of an
export subsidy (tax) and an import subsidy (tari¤) in the current setting is under-
stood. In the current setting with symmetric countries, a countrys aggregate export
revenue earned by its exporting rms is equal to its aggregate value of imports f.o.b.
from its trading partners. Thus, countries by agreeing to levying a reciprocal import
tari¤ (   1), which discourages the quantity of imports and collects tari¤ revenues
on the reduced import volume, is equivalent to levying a reciprocal export tax of
the same magnitude, which reduces the quantity of exports and collects tax revenues
from these reduced exports. Both discourage the volume of trade while generate tax
revenues. Similarly, a reciprocal import subsidy is equivalent to a reciprocal export
subsidy of the same magnitude. Thus, in this setting, it is su¢ cient to focus the
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policy negotiations on just the imports or the exports. With this equivalence noted,
the following discussions continue with the reference to the import tari¤.
Following the characterization inMelitz (2003), let e'(') 1 = 1
1 G(')
R1
'
 1g()d,
k(') = [e'(')='] 1   1, and j(') = [1   G(')]k('), where G(') is the cumula-
tive distribution function corresponding to g('), e'(') represents the weighted av-
erage of rm productivities above a cuto¤ level ', k(') the average rm prot
derived from the domestic (overseas) market as a ratio of xed overhead (export)
cost, and j(') the corresponding unconditional expected prot. Note that j0(') =
  1
'
(   1)[1   G(')][k(') + 1] < 0, as shown in Melitz (2003). Firms with the pro-
ductivity level ' and 'x make just enough variable prots from the domestic market
and overseas markets to cover the xed overhead production cost and the xed export
cost, respectively: d(') = rd(')=   f = 0, x = rx('x)=   fx = 0. These dene
their relationship:
'x = 

 1 (fx=f)
1
 1 ': (1)
It is assumed that fx > f so that not all rms export, which is a weaker condition
on the magnitude of trade cost than in Melitz (2003) by a factor of  for  > 1, the
reason for such a di¤erence being the same as mentioned above that exporting is more
di¢ cult with import tari¤s than with iceberg transport cost. Free entry ensures that
the expected prot of entry equals the entry cost, which leads to another condition
on the cuto¤ productivity levels:
fj(') + nfxj('x) = fe; (2)
which is the same as in Melitz (2003). Thus, (1) and (2) determine the cuto¤ produc-
tivity levels 'and 'x. It is worth noting that the equilibrium lower cuto¤productivity
level ' will be lower and the export cuto¤ productivity level 'x will be higher with
import tari¤s than with iceberg transport cost of the same magnitude, as illustrated
in Figure 1. This is because (2) is the same in both cases depicting a negative rela-
tionship between the two cuto¤ productivity levels to maintain a constant expected
prot of entry. On the other hand, (1) drawing a positive relationship between the
two cuto¤ productivity levels in regard with their relative market shares has a higher
positive slope with import tari¤s than with iceberg transport cost. Thus, import
tari¤s harm exporters and protect local producers more than iceberg transport cost.
The average rm prot for successful entrants  = fe= [1 G(')] is therefore lower
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Figure 1: Relative magnitude of lower cuto¤ and export cuto¤ productivity levels
with import tari¤s and with iceberg transport cost
with import tari¤s than with iceberg transport cost.
It is straightforward to verify that an increase in the import tari¤has qualitatively
similar e¤ects as an increase in the iceberg transport cost on all the rm level variables
such as ', 'x, domestic sales rd(') for ' > '
, and combined domestic and overseas
sales rd(') + nrx(') for ' > 'x. For example, an increase in import tari¤s will lower
the survival cuto¤ productivity level but raises the bar for rms to export:
@'
@
=   
   1
'

nfxj
0('x)'

x
fj0(')' + nfxj0('x)'x
< 0; (3)
@'x
@
=   fj
0(')
nfxj0('x)
@'
@
> 0: (4)
It also increases a rms domestic sales, lowers an exporters overseas sales, and
overall decreases an exporters combined domestic and overseas sales: @rd(')
@
> 0, and
@[rd(')+nrx(')]
@
< 0.
I now characterize the aggregate equilibrium. Let R denote the aggregate rm
revenue and TR the aggregate tari¤ revenue. In equilibrium, a countrys aggregate
expenditure E = TR + R equals its aggregate income TR + L (the aggregate rm
prot  does not enter the aggregate income calculation separately, as with free entry,
it is equal to the aggregate labor Le used for entry investment that is part of L). This
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implies that R = L. The same condition appeared in Melitz (2003). However, bear
in mind that in the case of import tari¤s, the average rm prot is lower and the
probability of export conditional on successful entry px  [1 G('x)]=[1 G(')] is
lower; thus, the average rm revenue r  ( + f + npxfx) is lower as well. As a
result, a larger mass of local rms (goods) M = R=r = L=r can be supported with
import tari¤s compared with iceberg transport cost. On the other hand, the mass of
foreign varieties imported from each trading partner Mx  pxM = L==px+f=px+nfx =
L=
fe=[1 G('x)]+f=px+nfx is smaller with import tari¤s than with iceberg transport cost, as
both the unconditional probability of export 1 G('x) and the conditional probability
of export px are lower.
The welfare per capita
W =
Q
L
=
(R + TR)=P
L
= (1 + TR=L)P 1 (5)
reects the real wage component P 1 shown in Melitz (2003) and a new component
representing the extra source of income from the transfer of tari¤revenues (TR=L)P 1
in real terms. Let us introduce some notations to characterize these welfare compo-
nents. First, note that the portion of export sales in the aggregate rm revenue di¤er
from Melitz (2003) by a factor of  :
R = Mrd + nMxrx
 M
 e'
'
 1
rd('
) + nMx
e'x
'x
 1
rx('

x)
= M
 e'
'
 1
rd('
) + nMx
e'x
'
 1
'
'x
 1
rd('

x)
 
= M
 e'
'
 1
rd('
) + nMx
e'x
'
 1
rd('
) ;
where e'  e'(') and e'x  e'('x). Let Mt  M + nMx = (1 + npx)M denote
the total mass of varieties available in each country. Dene b' 1t  [Me' 1 +
nMx(e'x=) 1 1]=Mt, where b't can be regarded as the weighted average produc-
tivity of all rms with their relative output shares as the weights (exporters with
a productivity level ' behave in overseas markets just like a local rm with a pro-
ductivity level '= in terms of pricing and output shares) and with the productivity
of all exporters further down-weighted by a factor  reecting the part of overseas
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sales paid to the importing country as tari¤s and not captured as export revenues. It
follows that
R =Mtrd(b't) = L: (6)
Similarly note that,
R + TR = Mrd + nMxrx + (   1)nMxrx
= Mtrd(e't); (7)
with e' 1t  Me' 1 + nMx(e'x=) 1 =Mt, where e't is the average productivity of
all rms weighted by their relative output shares. In the case of iceberg transport
cost, there is not such a distinction between (6) and (7); instead, it holds that R =
Mtrd(e't) = L as seen in Melitz (2003). Next, one can verify that
P =M
1
1 
t pd (e't) ; (8)
whose expressions are the same as in Melitz (2003), as transport cost and tari¤s have
the same e¤ect on pricing behaviors of rms. Using (6), (7), and (8), we can show
that
1 + TR=L =
e'tb't
 1
; (9)
P 1 = 

L
f
 1
 1
e'tb't

'; (10)
W = 

L
f
 1
 1
e'tb't

': (11)
I now characterize the comparative statics of the income component and the price
component of the welfare as the tari¤ rate changes. Given the denitions of e't andb't, note that e'tb't
 1
=
1 + npx (e'x=e') 1  1 
1 + npx (e'x=e') 1   = 1 + nB
1 
1 + nB 
;
where B  px (e'x=e') 1 = hR1'x ' 1g(')d'i = hR1' ' 1g(')d'i, which is (roughly
speaking) the aggregate productivity of exporting rms relative to that of all active
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rms. Obviously, this decreases in the tari¤ rate (@B=@ < 0), since fewer rms
enter the export market and more rms enter the local market with a higher tari¤,
as shown in (3) and (4). It can be shown that
@
@
e'tb't
 1
=
e'tb't
 1 
nB (1 + nB ) + nB  1(1  )
(1 + nB 1 )(1 + nB )
+
n ( @B=@)(1  )
(1 + nB 1 )(1 + nB )

; (12)
which is positive for   1. Thus, the tari¤ rate that maximizes a countrys tari¤
revenue (and hence income) is positive. This income e¤ect needs to be weighed against
the e¤ect of tari¤s on the price level P . It is not immediately clear whether a higher
tari¤ will increase or decrease the aggregate price level. A higher tari¤ increases the
consumer price of imports, but at the same time decreases the output shares (and
hence the importance) of imports in the aggregate price index; on the other hand,
a higher tari¤ also admits the survival of less productive rms who charge a higher
price. It can be shown that the net e¤ect of an increase in the import tari¤ above free
trade will drive the overall price level up, which imposes a negative e¤ect on welfare.
To show this, rst note that (3) can be re-expressed as @'

@
1
' =    1 nB
  1
1+nB  . Using
this and (12), it follows that
@P 1
@
= P 1

@ (e't=b't)
@
1
(e't=b't) + @'

@
1
'

= P 1
1
   1
(1  )nB (1 + nB ) + n ( @B=@)(1  )
(1 + nB 1 )(1 + nB )
;
(13)
which is negative for   1. Thus, starting from free trade, there is an incentive to
impose an import tari¤ due to income consideration, but at the same time, there is
an incentive to provide an import subsidy due to price consideration. The following
derivations show how these two considerations work against each other at di¤erent
levels of import tari¤ rates:
@W
@
= W

@(1 + TR=L)
@
1
1 + TR=L
+
@P 1
@
1
P 1

= W

   1
(   1)nB  1(1  ) + n ( @B=@)(1  )
(1 + nB 1 )(1 + nB )
; (14)
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where the second equality follows by using the results in (12) and (13). Thus,
@W
@
R 0,  Q 1;
and the welfare per capita is maximized at the free trade level. By increasing the im-
port tari¤ rate above the free trade level, the negative impact of a higher price level
outweighs any potential positive impact on income through tari¤ revenues. Con-
versely, the negative impact of a lower national income by providing an import sub-
sidy would outweigh any potential positive impact of a lower price level. The optimal
reciprocal tari¤ rate that will maximize every countrys welfare turns out to be zero.
This result is nontrivial given the fact that rms are heterogeneous in their produc-
tivities and trade policy may alter the composition of rms and hence the industry
aggregate productivity. For example, it may be tempting to argue that a reciprocal
import subsidy may be benecial, as it raises the industry productivity by shifting
market shares toward the more productive exporting rms and trimming the least
productive rms. The result above demonstrates that the positive productivity e¤ect,
reected in lower prices, of an import subsidy would be dominated by the subsidy
cost. On the other hand, a frequently heard argument for an import tari¤ in a mo-
nopolistically competitive setting is the distortion introduced by the price markup:
that domestic goods are bought at a price above their opportunity cost (i.e. the
marginal cost of production), whereas imported goods are bought at a price equal to
their opportunity cost (i.e. their o¤shore price). Such a distortion may be corrected
with an import tari¤ by encouraging more consumption of local goods. The result
above shows that such potential positive e¤ects on welfare of an import tari¤ would
be more than o¤set by its negative impact on the aggregate productivity. Thus, the
old doctrine for reciprocal free trade generated from the classical paradigm of per-
fect competition with homogeneous goods holds true in a world with monopolistic
competition and heterogeneous rms.
Jørgensen and Schröder (2005) also study the optimal reciprocal trade policy in
a setting with heterogeneous rms. However, they model the rm heterogeneity in
terms of xed export cost rather than rm productivities. Firms are identical other-
wise. Thus, the dynamic e¤ects of trade policy on the industry aggregate productivity
as emphasized here are absent in their framework. Contrary to the current result,
they found that the optimal reciprocal import tari¤ rate is positive. This di¤erence
10
may be explained by the fact that the negative impact of a positive import tari¤ on
the aggregate productivity (and hence on the welfare level) is not taken into account
in their framework.
Contrary to multilateral, reciprocal, trade policies, unilateral trade policies are
another interesting question. This was studied by Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare
(2007) in a small economy setting. Because of the small economy setting, asymmetric
economic structures across countries are allowed; however, parametric assumptions
have to be imposed to derive their results. It is unclear how trade policy and transport
cost will compare in their framework. In any case, trade restrictions in their setting
will not play a symmetric role as here on the importing and the exporting country,
since the rest of the worlds expenditure, price level, and cost structure are taken to be
xed. They found that the optimal unilateral policy for a small economy is an import
tari¤, an export tax, or a consumption subsidy of the same magnitude. This lack of
incentives to further lower the import tari¤ unilaterally to the free trade level may
be explained by the lack of extra export revenues (and extra push to the aggregate
productivity level) that would be generated if the tari¤ reduction were reciprocal.
3 Conclusion
As we allow trade cost to take on the meaning of trade policy barriers instead of
iceberg transport cost, we see that most of the qualitative e¤ects of trade restrictions
on the rm-level variables hold true as they were proposed by Melitz (2003). This
similarity probably explains the impressions that trade policy barriers are equivalent
to iceberg transport cost. However, we also verify from the above analysis that
they are not equivalent in the strength of their trade-restricting e¤ects and of their
welfare implications. With import tari¤s, welfare includes an extra real tari¤ revenue
component in addition to the real wage component. The variation of welfare with
respect to tari¤ rates can be analyzed by studying the variation of the tari¤ revenue
and the variation of the aggregate price level as the tari¤ rate changes. Derivations
of these comparative statics are complicated by the fact that as the tari¤ rate varies,
the cuto¤ productivity levels for production and for export and the mass of local
and imported varieties all change at the same time, as was the case in Melitz (2003).
They are further complicated by the fact that tari¤ revenues and the aggregate price
level are nonlinear in tari¤ rates in di¤erent directions. However, as shown, these
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derivations are analytically tractable and have sensible economic interpretations. In
the end, the conicting impacts on welfare via these components as the tari¤ rate
varies sum up to a clear cut result that free trade is the best reciprocal policy.
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